Abstract -Reliability differentiated pricing (RDP) is known to improve the efficiency and benefits of consumers and producers. Outage costs representing the economic and non-economic consequences of service curtailments to customers can be used as an effective parameter of RDP in electricity markets. This paper examines the theoretical aspects of an RDP scheme, and derives the optimal decisions of consumers and electric utilities for long-term transactions. The proposed RDP is demonstrated through a case study on a wheeling service.
Introduction
Electricity consumers are often given the choice of different levels of service reliability [1] - [3] . Typically, customers would opt for the level of reliability that best suits their needs and processes. Such a choice is argued to "unbundle" the service, resulting in improved efficiency and benefits to both consumers and producers. However, thus far, these available priority pricing schemes have led to economic inefficiencies; they even fall short in attaining welfare maximization of the utility [4] .
Real-time pricing or spot market pricing schemes have failed to consider long-run costs entailed in electricity production, such as capital costs of the added capacity. Moreover, real systems, in general, may not recover the sufficient revenue for the utility. Thus far, the suggested schemes to recover the required revenue, such as in the Ramsey-type pricing schemes applied to real-time pricing, result in welfare loss.
The pricing policy proposed in [5] - [8] could overcome most of the shortcomings entailed in both priority pricing and real-time pricing. In addition, under certain assumptions, the proposed pricing policy could recover revenues without any welfare loss. It could also differentiate the prices for varying levels of service reliability based on consumer outage costs.
In the analysis that follows, outages are assumed to occur without prior notification and that they occur in "short" duration. Outage costs are defined as costs incurred by customers due to sudden shortage in power supply; this is over and above the loss in relation to consumer benefits due to the said shortage. One reason for this is the sudden shortage of supply. Losses occur due to interruption of production processes, which could have been avoided if rescheduling is carried out. Rescheduling could only be accomplished if prior notice of the outage is conducted.
Theory of Reliability Differentiated Pricing (RDP) [4]-[7]
A single welfare-maximizing public utility is assumed to own and operate the generating plants and the transmission network of a given electric power system, which is sold independently to customers. It is also assumed that the utility could set and communicate the prices, as well as set a different price range for each customer class, at each moment instantaneously. Supply outages occur randomly in relation to the probability of a possibly known outage. In effect, customers only learn of an outage after it occurs. Outages are assumed to be of short duration, such that customers who continue to access the utility service will not find it feasible or profitable to reschedule their production processes (i.e., change their electricity usage pattern) from the high production prices during outage duration. It is assumed that the utility could ration the supply shortages among its targeted customer classes.
Consumer Behavior [5]
Individual customers act independently. Customers are modeled as price-taking, profit-maximizing firms. Assume that all customers, can be classified into a finite number of classes, i I  at I = {1,...,N}, then each class consisting of customers would have the same outage cost at a particular location. Total time T consists of short discrete time intervals t T  . Customer i's electricity demand at time t is denoted by it Q .
Consider a short-term rational customer whose benefit from electricity usage at any time depends on consumption at that time only. Hence, the customer maximizes consumer surplus at each t independently. At any time t , let i F be the value-added or benefit function for customer i's use of electricity i
where i P is the price of electricity. Fig. 1 shows the expected short-run customer demand curve DD, a very short-run customer demand curve D'E, and supply curve SS of electricity. 
where it P is the expected price of electricity. The outage cost function includes loss in customer benefit (the bold letters represent expected values). Thus, the customer would equate the expected net marginal benefit to the expected price of electricity.
In the analysis that follows, the value-added function of the customer is extended to include both real and reactive power demands at the fundamental frequency of 60 Hz: 
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Objective
The objective of the short-run operating and optimal pricing problem in a welfare-maximizing utility using the criterion of consumers plus producers surplus can be stated as ( , ) ( , )
where [ ] E  : expected value of the argument, 
PC P Q : cost of producing real and reactive power at bus i , and ( , )
EC P Q : cost of purchasing real and reactive power at bus i .
All decision variables, with the exception of those involving reactive power, are nonnegative. . The objective function is assumed as a differentiable with a continuous first derivative. For optimal operating and pricing strategies, the objective is to maximize the subject for the operating and network constraints inherent in the system.
Optimal Long-Term Prices
Section 2 deals with the short-run problem of a welfaremaximizing utility from which optimal short-term reliability-differentiated prices are derived from. This section examines the long-run social welfare maximization problem of the utility developed from the previous section. Based on these, we derive the differentiated prices of long-term reliability, which considers cost of capital or other fixed costs of production. Long-term transactions, such as firm capacity purchased from or by the utility, or purchased from individual generators in the case of a network utility, the access to transmission services and wheeling transactions would require the provision of long-term prices in order for the participants to enter into contracts and to accommodate optimal investment decisions.
Consider the long-run resource planning problem of a welfare-maximizing utility. To obtain the given values of customer demands, the welfare-maximizing utility must first solve the following problem of minimizing long-run expected societal costs in order to determine the optimal resource plan,
which is subject to the following constraints: ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
where  
; ,
The customer sets the expected net marginal benefit from the electricity consumption equal to the expected price of electricity. Then, the respective optimal long-term prices for real and reactive power inducing customers to behave in a social welfare-maximizing manner are given by:
Thus, by employing socially optimal investment decision-making, long-term prices of real and reactive power could coincide with short-term reliability-differentiated prices. However, optimal investments require the evaluation of future uncertainty, which is often difficult to carry out. Another difficulty is the unavailability of proper demand models that could capture the interdependence of intertemporal demands. In principle, one should utilize benefit functions that depend on the entire time stream of demand rather than a single point in time.
Case Study
Implications for Pricing Firm Capacity
Firm capacity refers to the generation of capacity that is purchased by the utility from neighboring utilities, namely, independent power producers (IPP) and cogenerators, in order to provide customers with long-run higher levels of service reliability. The price paid for firm capacity should equal the value or marginal benefit that the customers derive from the added capacity. Purchasing firm capacity is a long-term contract forged to protect against the loss of customer load due to unplanned outage of generating units. Thus, in order to determine the optimal price of firm capacity purchases, the long-run problem of welfare-maximizing utility given in Equations (9)-(10) must be considered. Again, this problem could be solved when obtaining the optimal values of all variab1es as functions of the parameters of the problem, in particular,
The shadow price of added capacity (i.e., the Lagrange multiplier of the capacity constraint) represents the willingness of customers to pay for the obtained added capacity. Based on Equations (12) and (13), the respective optimal firm capacity purchase prices at bus j for real and reactive power capacity are expressed by
Numerical Example: Calculation of Long-Term Rates
Consider the simple four-bus system in Fig. 2 . In the figure, Gi and Li represent generating unit and load at Bus In the model, there are two generating units (G2 and G4) and one transmission line (T3) with non-zero forced outage rates. Thus, at each instance over time, there are eight possible system configurations or states that the system can utilize. The load at each bus is assumed consisting of 1 MW of individual customer load for those that belong to the same class (i.e., classes that have the same outage cost.)
Assuming that the system is operated optimally by a single welfare-maximizing utility, then the expected reliability-differentiated price for customers of class j is given by The price of capacity purchase from generator i is given by
Thus, the prices of capacity purchase from the generators of the system are Hence, under RDP, the total expected revenue from sales to customers is exactly equal to the sum total of all expected costs/payments for the system (i.e., TR = TC).
Conclusion and Future Study
Outage costs play an essential role in electricity pricing and in the planning of electrical power systems. The central role of outage costs in the optimal investment planning of the power system from a societal point of view, particularly for setting economic reliability standards in the generation, transmission, and distribution planning, has been emphasized by many studies. As outage costs reflect the prices at which customers are willing to pay for continued service in a very short run, it can provide for the economically efficient basis when rationing supply at times of shortages. Unbundling the services by offering consumers options on trade offs for service reliability, quality, and price can potentially increase the economic efficiency of the entire system, producing benefits for both the utility and the customers. In this sense, outage costs can be an efficient basis of RDP.
We propose RDP in examining the proposed pricing scheme of long-term transaction, putting emphasis on the long-term contract of firm capacity. The proposed pricing scheme is applicable and compliant when deriving at optimal decisions. However, the implications of the proposed pricing scheme for the wheeling service and transmission service needs to be dealt with further by future studies.
